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iv

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4103(2)0).
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
Issue 1: Whether the district court correctly concluded that, under Jensen v.
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325, claims that are based on the exact same operative
facts that would support a defamation claim are subject to Utah's one-year limitations
period for defamation.
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure presents a question of law that this Court
reviews for correctness. Oakwood Village L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ^| 9,
104 P.3d 1226. Significantly, however, due to the First Amendment interests at stake
when allegedly defamatory conduct is at issue, this Court applies a unique standard of
review under which, unlike a normal motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party is not
entitled to any inferences in his favor. Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, \ 18, 212 P.3d 535.
Preservation: This issue was preserved by written motion and memoranda, (R.
447, 453-55, 1116, 1131-32), and by oral argument (R. 1560, at 6:18-8:7; 104:23-107:1),
and was noted by the district court's final Memorandum Decision and Order. (R. 152332.)
Issue 2: Whether the district court correctly concluded that petitioning the Utah
Division of Real Estate for revocation of a real estate broker's license based on allegedly

1

sanctionable misconduct constitutes petitioning of a governmental agency within the
scope of immunity afforded by the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rides of Civil Procedure presents a question of law that this Court
reviews for correctness. Oakwood Village, 2004 UT 101, f 9. However, because the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is based on "[t]he First Amendment. . . right to 'petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.,'" Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, \
26, 116 P.3d 323 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. I), this Court should apply Utah's unique
standard of review for claims implicating First Amendment interests under which, unlike
a normal motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party is not entitled to any inferences in his
favor. Jacob, 2009 UT 37, % 18.
Alternatively, if this Court is not inclined to apply the standard of review set forth
in Jacob, this Court "accept[s] the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
interprets] those facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff as the non-moving party." Oakwood Village, 2004 UT 101, f 9. In doing so,
this Court "need not accept extrinsic facts not pleaded." Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain
Resorts, L. C, 2010 UT 29, 1f 10, 232 P.3d 999. Nor is this Court required to accept as
true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations in the complaint. See id.; Bennett v.
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, | 60, 70 P.3d 17 ("[T]he sufficiency
of [the plaintiffs] pleadings must be determined by the facts pleaded rather than the
conclusions stated." (internal quotations omitted)).

2

Preservation: This issue was preserved by written motion and memoranda, (R.
1116, 1132-36), and by oral argument (R. 1560, at 24:11-43:17, 107:4-114:6), and was
noted by the district court's final Memorandum Decision and Order. (R. 1532-40.)
Issue 3: Whether, as an alternate ground for affirming the district court's rulings,
the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it violates Rule 8 by failing
to differentiate among the allegedly wrongful conduct of the numerous defendants.
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure presents a question of law that this Court
reviews for correctness. Oakwood Village, 2004 UT 101, f 9. In conducting this review,
this Court "may affirm the decision rendered below . . . on a ground on which the district
court did not rely." First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56, U 11, 52
P.3dll37.
Preservation: This issue was preserved by written motion and memoranda. (R.
1116, 1137-40); see also First Equity, 2002 UT 56, 1j 11 ("[I]t is well established that an
appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from
that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even
though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not
raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court.").

3

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
•

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

That Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
Utah Code section 78B-2-302 provides that:
An action may be brought within one year:
(1) for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state;
(2) upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the action is given to an
individual, or to an individual and the state, except when the statute imposing it
prescribes a different limitation;
(3) upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal action, for a forfeiture or
penalty to the state;
(4) for libel, slander, false imprisonment, or seduction;
(5) against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a prisoner arrested or
imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process;
(6) against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries to property caused by a
mob or riot;
(7) except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, against a county legislative
body or a county executive to challenge a decision of the county legislative body or
county executive, respectively; or
(8) on a claim for relief or a cause of action under Title 63L, Chapter 5, Utah
Religious Land Use Act.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
Plaintiff/Appellant Douglas Bates ("Bates") was a Utah "Principal Broker" and the

founder, president, and sole shareholder of AllPro Realty Group, Inc. ("AHPro"), which
by September 2007 was the largest real estate brokerage in the state. (R. 264, fflf 19-20,
22.) By fall 2008, with the housing market in rapid decline, Bates's business collapsed,
and he failed to pay over $500,000 in commissions owed to his agents. (R. 276, ^} 85,
87; R. 281, If 140; R. 317, K 331; R. 1560, at 29:14-30:8, 54:23-56:13, 69:15-75:13.)
As a result, Defendant/Appellee Mike Ostermiller ("Ostermiller") and "at least
forty other unknown Defendants" allegedly held a meeting at which they "signed a
petition[] for the [Utah Division of Real Estate ("UDRE")] to revoke Bates's [real estate]
license," (R. 276,ffl[88-89), and, shortly thereafter, certain defendants/appellees initiated
an administrative proceeding against Bates before the UDRE. (R. 277, Iffi 93-95.) The
basis on which the petition filed with the UDRE sought revocation of Bates's real estate
license was that his non-payment of commissions to his agents constituted sanctionable
misconduct.

(R. 1159-63.)

In a 24-page decision, the Administrative Law Judge

dismissed the proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R. 1145-68.)
Bates responded to the attempt to revoke his license and his expulsion from the
SLBR with a lawsuit. (R. 1-143.) His initial Complaint, filed on January 24, 2011,
named no fewer than 37 state officials, realtor organizations, and individuals whom he
alleged had wronged him. (R. 1-143.) Bates's claims ran the gamut from violations of
due process, to malicious prosecution, to slander, to wrongful civil proceedings, to
5

violations of the Open and Public Meetings Act, to intentional infliction of emotional
distress, to violations of Utah's antitrust statutes. {Id.) Bates subsequent filed two more
complaints, repeatedly changing causes of action and the defendants. (R. 144-380.)
Bates's Second Amended Complaint, filed May 4, 2011, required for multiple
amendments, named thirteen parties as defendants, was 74 pages long, contained more
than 403 paragraphs, and included nine causes of action: Defamation, Defamation Per Se,
Conspiracy to Defame, False Light, Unfair Business Practices, Abuse of Process,
Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations, Tortious Interference with Economic
Relations, and Conspiracy to Destroy Trade.. (R. 261-380.) The central thrust of the
allegations was that mostly undifferentiated "defendants" defamed, brought improper
administrative proceedings against, or discriminated against Bates in an effort to blacken
his personal and professional reputation and thereby squeeze him out of the Utah real
estate market following his nonpayment of commissions to his agents. (Id.) As a result
of this alleged conduct, the Second Amended Complaint sought (1) injunctive relief; (2)
declaratory relief; (3) statutory and treble damages; (4) compensatory damages; and (5)
punitive damages. (R. 333-34, ffi[ 1-10.) Several groups of defendants filed motions to
dismiss ("Defendants' Motions to Dismiss"). (R. 1516.)
On November 28, 2011, the district court granted the Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss. (R. 1560, at 122:7-17.) In its Memorandum Decision and Order ("Order") (R.
1523-40), the district court determined that under Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130
P.3d 325, Bates's four defamation-related claims (one through four) are barred by Utah's
one-year limitations period. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-302(4). (R. 1524-25.)

6

The district court also held that, "to the extent Bates's remaining claims [causes of
action five through nine] arise from the same operative facts as his four defamationrelated claims, Bates's remaining claims are also governed by Utah's one-year limitations
period applicable to defamation, and are similarly time-barred."

(R. 1525 (quoting

Jensen, 2005 UT 81, ^f 53).) In doing so, the district court reiterated its earlier finding
that "the sole allegations against [certain defendants] are based on allegedly defamatory
conduct," (R. 1532), that Bates has failed to challenge and thereby conceded on appeal.
{See Brief of Appellant at 1-2, 13-15.) "[T]his conclusion . . . means that all claims
against [Defendants] are time-barred and hereby dismissed." (Id.) The district court also
disposed of the other five causes of action by holding "to the extent Bates's remaining
claims do not arise from the same operative facts as his four defamation-related claims,
[they] are barred by the Noerr'-Pennington Doctrine." (R. 1540.)
By petitioning the UDRE for the revocation of Bates's license based on
sanctionable misconduct, the defendants were petitioning of a governmental agency
within the scope of immunity afforded by Noerr-Pennington. (R. 1534-35.) The district
court also concluded that the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is
inapplicable. (R. 1535-40.)
On January 24, 2012, Bates filed a Notice of Appeal in the Utah Supreme Court
only with respect to that "part of the [district court's] order that dismisses causes of
action (5) through nine (9) with prejudice." (R. 1548-49.) On February 2, 2012, the Utah
Supreme Court gave notice of the transfer of the appeal to this Court. (R. 1552, 1555.)
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II.

Statement of Relevant Facts and Issues.
Of the 403 separate allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, only two

reference Sandra Hoover. Both of them allege that Hoover made defamatory statements
about Bates and his treatment of his daughters, R. 292 fl[ 148) and 313 fl[ 257).. These
statements were purportedly made more than a year prior to the initiation of this action.
Michael J. Ostermiller ("Ostermiller") is mentioned nine times in the general
allegations, and once in the prayer for relief See R. 270-343,fflf7, 10, 48, 90, 155, 223,
261, 307, and 392. Ostermiller is alleged to have met "privately in a closed meeting" with
members of the UDRE to find a way to punish Bates. R. 276-77, and 307.
Northern Wasatch Association of Realtors ("NWAR") is mentioned 11 times. Id.
fflf 7, 26, 39, 63, 148, 155, 230, 261, 275, 307 and 324. Its is alleged to have formed a
monopoly with other defendants (R. 279), changed its rules toward Bates (R. 284), and
engaged in a conspiracy to ruin Bates's reputation (R. 208). These cryptically and
sporadic references in the Complaint are usually grouped with 40 other "defendants".
For instance, Bates alleges that Ostermiller met with other defendants in November 2008,
(Second Amended Complaint,ffif90 & 223), but fails to allege anything specific. The
Court is left to guess the extent of his role.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The one-year limitations period bars Bates's causes of actions one through four.
Bates offers no explanation for why the one-year limitations for defamation should not
apply to those claims, and fails to offer any facts in support of them that do not arise from
the same operative facts. The one-year period applies to any proceeding challenging an

8

expulsion, suspension, or termination, including a proceeding in which defective notice is
alleged. Since Bates was expelled in December 2008 (R.275), the underlying action is
untimely.
Noerr'-Pennington1 bars causes of actions 5 through 9 to the extent they do not
arise from the same operative facts as Bates's four defamation-related claims. The
"sham" exception is inapplicable, and was not preserved for appeal. Bates does not
provide sufficient grounds for a private cause of action under the Unfair Practice Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-17.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT BATES'S
CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY UTAH'S ONE-YEAR LIMITATIONS
PERIOD FOR DEFAMATION.
In Jensen v. Sawyer, 2005 UT 81, the court considered whether the one year

limitations period for libel and slander applied to a claim of false light. If it did not, the
residual period would have preserved Bates's claim. The court determined that the
"essence and substance of the claim" - not the labels attached by the parties - indicated
which limitations period applies.

The court noted that the "conduct Dr. Jensen

complained of under this [new] theory was the same [as the conduct complained of under
defamation]. Only the legal grounds were different."

1

The doctrine was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). The Court later expanded on the doctrine in California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
9

Bates's Second Amended Complaint advances the same facts in support of causes
of action 1 through 4 (defamation claims) and causes of action 5 through 9. Jensen bars
Bates's other claims because they arise from the same operative facts. (R.1523.)
"[T]he statute of limitations for defamation governs claims based on the same
operative facts that would support a defamation action." Id. at 53. Jensen held that
claims arising from the same operative facts as defamation will be subject to the one-year
limitations period.
Bates has failed to identify what facts, supportive of causes of action 5 through 9,
are not defamatory in nature. Absent a distinction between the defamatory and the nonrelated conduct, the one-year limitations period applies to all of the claims.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT BATES'S
CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE.
Bates contends that "although the Supreme Court has extended Noerr immunity

derived from the Sherman Act to conduct alleged to be illegal, any Noerr immunity
derived from the First Amendment cannot immunize illegal conduct[.]..." (Appellant's
Br. at 18, § II.B.) The Noerr-Pennington analysis is the same whether the underlying
claims are state tort or federal antitrust claims since Noerr-Pennington immunity is
grounded in the First Amendment. What Bates perceives as an advantageous distinction
in the case law—"any Noerr immunity derived from the First Amendment cannot
immunize illegal conduct," (Appellant's Br. at 18, § II.B)—is really just his contorted
view of a universal truism: conduct that is not immune is not immune. The overarching
presence of the First Amendment actually hurts, rather than helps, Bates's argument

10

because it highlights his fundamental weakness: defendants were exercising their First
Amendment right to petition the UDRE to revoke Bates's license.
A.

Noerr-Pennington immunity is grounded in the First Amendment.

Utah courts have consistently characterized Noerr-Pennington as a type of First
Amendment immunity. 'The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees citizens the right to 'petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'"
Anderson Dev. Co., 2005 UT 36, ^ 26, 116 P.3d 323 (quoting U.S. Const, amend. I). "In
recognition of this right, the United States Supreme Court has held that individuals and
organizations are immune from liability under antitrust laws for actions constituting
petitions to the government." Id. "Over the years, courts have extended this immunity
doctrine, referred to as the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine . . . to 'protect... political activity
against tort claims as well as antitrust claims.'" Id. (quoting Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d
682, 684 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted)).
In Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Landowners Ass Jn v. Grassy Meadows Airport,
Inc., 2012 UT App 182, f l 7 n.10, this Court acknowledged that Noerr-Pennington is a
form of First Amendment immunity. This Court has spoken of Noerr-Pennington and
First Amendment immunity interchangeably in a "constitutional right to petition"
context. No matter how the immunity is labeled, petitioning the government is a
protected right.

11

B.

The District Court correctly concluded that the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine applied to the state law claims alleged by Bates.

Although not raised below,2 Bates now argues that the immunity afforded by
Noerr-Pennington is circumscribed when the claims alleged are state-law claims rather
than federal antitrust claims. Bates contends that the district court erred in applying
Noerr-Pennington without allegedly conducting a separate First Amendment analysis.
But a Noerr-Pennington analysis always constitutes a First Amendment analysis. Bates
relies on Astoria Entertainment, Inc. v. DeBartolo, 12 So. 3d 956 (La. 2009), in which the
court held that criminal conduct (the bribing of public officials) is not entitled to First
Amendment immunity. The Astoria case is unhelpful here for several reasons.
First, the conduct alleged in Astoria was criminal in nature, unlike the tortious
conduct alleged in this case. Id. at 967. The Astoria holding is admittedly narrow —
"even accepting that Noerr-Pennington is generally applicable in our state courts, and to
state law claims, we must still determine whether the doctrine is applicable based on the
specific facts of this case." Id.
Second, Astoria made no attempt to analyze or set forth a test for determining
whether the conduct alleged constituted petitioning activity. The court simply
pronounced the defendants' alleged conduct was "criminal" and concluded that it was not
entitled to First Amendment immunity. Id. The Astoria decision gives absolutely no
2

Bates failed to raise this issue below and therefore did not preserve the issue for appeal. See
Donjuan v. McDermott, 2011 UT 72, H 20, 266 P.3d 839. Bates fails to include a citation to the
record showing that this issue was preserved. (Appellant's Br. at 2.) Since Bates has not argued
that this Court should consider the issue under the exceptional circumstances or plain error
standards of review, the Court should refuse to consider it.

12

guidance for how a court is supposed to determine what constitutes petitioning activity
versus what does not. The conduct complained of was not the defendants' use of state
proceedings, but rather bribery payments to tilt the administrative process. The bribery
payments occurred outside the channels of any formal proceeding, unlike the UDRE
administrative petition Bates complains of in this case.
Third, the Astoria court made an unnecessary distinction between NoerrPennington

immunity and First Amendment immunity even though it openly

acknowledged "that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine stems ... from the right to petition
governments granted by the First Amendment." Id. at 962. If there is a difference, the
Astoria court failed to identify what it is. And while the Astoria court acknowledged
"that there is no reason that the constitutional protection of the right to petition should be
less compelling in the context of claims that arise outside of the scope of antitrust laws,"
it created a dichotomy between Noerr-Pennington and First Amendment immunity when
the two are in fact the same. Id. at 964.
Astoria is inconsistent with the almost universally accepted Noerr-Pennington
analysis applied by the Utah Supreme Court and federal and state courts throughout the
country. Noerr-Pennington is a First Amendment doctrine, and consequently c"[t]here is
simply no reason that a common-law tort doctrine can any more permissibly abridge or
chill the constitutional right of petition than can a statutory claim such as antitrust.'"
Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News America Marketing FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 1007 (9th Cir.
2008) (quoting Video Int'l Prod., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Comm., Inc., 858 F.2d
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1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988)); see also Harrah's Vicksburg Corp. v. Pennebaker, 812 So.
2d 163, 171 (Miss. 2001) (same).
Although the claims raised in Anderson were state law claims, the Utah Supreme
Court applied a Noerr-Pennington Doctrine/First Amendment analysis to bar the state
law tort claims. 2005 UT 36, ffl[ 26-28. The court acknowledged that the defendants'
First Amendment petitioning rights were so paramount that, "[e]ven if, as [the plaintiff]
alleges, [the defendants] misrepresented to the City Council their ability to raise funds to
purchase the land, the use of that improper means' would not be sufficient to except [the
defendants] from the immunity provided under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in light of
their uncontested intent to achieve a favorable governmental result." Id. ^ 28.
In Searle, involving tortious interference claims, the court acknowledged that
"[t]he First Amendment protects expressions designed to influence governmental action
even when the content of those expressions brings incidental injury to parties concerned."
646 P.2d at 689. Searle makes clear that it is not the content of expression but the context
that is paramount. Expressions or petitions within the context of a formal governmental
proceeding are absolutely immune (barring application of any relevant sham exception),
whereas expressions of petitions outside the context of a formal government proceeding
enjoy no such absolute immunity.
The Searle court held that the Humane Society's media campaign was not
petitioning activity entitled to immunity because "[p]art of this publicity was directed
outside Uintah County in an attempt to discourage tourists from visiting the area until
conditions were corrected" and did not involve (at least directly) the channels of
14

government. The Searle court held that there is no immunity where the alleged injury
results "not from defendants' complaints to city and county officials or from their reports
concerning conditions at the dog pound" but from conduct occurring outside the formal
channels of government. 646 P.2d at 689.
The Searle and Anderson cases establish that it is the conduct of the party seeking
immunity and the context in which it occurs—not the theory of liability asserted by the
plaintiff—that governs the application of Noerr-Pennington/First Amendment immunity.
Bates's assertion that Noerr-Pennington immunity should not apply simply because he
claims he has alleged "illegal conduct, including libel, intentional interference with
economic relations, and abuse of process," (Appellant's Br. at 18), is misguided and
directly contrary to established precedents. Where, as here, the conduct alleged to have
caused injury was the defendants' utilization of the formal, public processes of
government, Noerr-Pennington immunity applies.
C.

The District Court correctly concluded that defendants' alleged
petitions to the UDRE constitute political activity protected by the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.

Bates seeks to avoid application of Noerr-Pennington by arguing that the
defendants' petitioning conduct does not qualify because (1) the defendants' conduct
"offers no political justification and was completely absent of any public actor," and (2)
"the petition was directed towards people 'unaccountable to the public and without
official authority' . . . and were not 'public' and a petition directed towards them was not
political activity." (Appellant's Br. at 22.) Neither of these contentions has merit.
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1.

The gravamen of Bates's claims constitutes constitutionally
protected petitioning activity.

Although Bates's Second Amended Complaint unquestionably seeks to hold the
defendants liable for their alleged petitions to the UDRE, he contends that the NoerrPennington Doctrine should not apply because a portion of the conduct alleged is conduct
"independent of petitioning conduct." (Appellant's Br. at 23.) 3 Bates fails to recognize
that each of the causes of action is based on the defendants' alleged petitioning conduct.
The Unfair Business Practices Act claim references the administrative proceeding
before the UDRE and seeks damages, inter alia, for "lost earnings, historically, as a result
of administrative proceedings brought against him"; "lost future earnings as a Utah
broker"; "costs of legal representation during administrative investigations"; and "costs
of legal representation in defending against administrative proceedings." (R. 321 (Sec.
Am. Compl. ffl[ 303-06, 312).) Bates also seeks punitive damages for "the use of public
offices and influence ... to gain unfair economic advantage and carry out anticompetitive and discriminatory behavior." (R. 323 (Sec. Am. Compl. ^J 313).) Bates
expressly relies on the initiation of the administrative proceedings to allege an Abuse of
Process claim, (R. 332 (Sec. Am. Compl. fflf 334-37)), a Tortious Interference with
Contractual Relations claim, (R. 329 (Sec. Am. Compl. fflf 343-46)), a Tortious
3

Bates cites to 170 paragraphs of his complaint is an attempt to shift the burden of research and
argument to the reviewing court. See Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, U 8, 995 P.2d 14. Only
12 of the 170 paragraphs cited by Bates constitute allegations of non-petitioning conduct. None
of those contains any factual allegations against specific defendants, only conclusory allegations.
(R. 282-332 ffl 58, 155, 157, 159, 161, 261, 266, 275, 292, 307, 308 and 400).)
3
Although Bates's first four causes of action also expressly rely on the administrative
proceeding, he has conceded that those claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
(Appellant's Br. at 13.)
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Interference with Economic Relations claim, (R. 332-33 (Sec. Am. Compl. ff 366-69)),
and a Conspiracy claim. (R. 336-38 (Sec. Am. Compl. 1fl[ 391, 401).)4
Bates claimed that the defendants' alleged petitions to the UDRE were "centered
around [Bates], AllPro, and [Bates's] brokerage license [and] the revocation of such
license...." (R. 307 (Sec. Am. Compl. f 226).) Bates conceded that "AllPro was unable
to pay due commissions," (R. 226 (Sec. Am. Compl. f 331)), that this non-payment of
commissions was the central issue placed before the administrative tribunal, (see, e.g., id.
fflf 86-89, 96, 112 & 329), and that, as the object of the alleged conspiracy against him,
"Defendants tried to have [Bates's] broker's license removed, improperly and under
improper pretense using said administrative proceeding." (Id. f 322; accord id. ff 34344, 366-68, 391, 397.) Given such allegations, the district court properly concluded that
"the gravamen of Bates's non-defamation claims" establish that the defendants' alleged
"UDRE petition was designed to achieve a favorable governmental result—the
revocation of Bates's license." (R. 1543-44 (Decision at 20-21).) Accordingly, properly
applying Anderson, the district court held that the "Defendants are immune from liability
under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine." (R. 1535-36 (Order at 20-21).)
Despite his express reliance on the defendants' alleged petitioning activities to
support each of his causes of action, Bates essentially now asks this Court to sever such
allegations from his Second Amended Complaint to allow his claims to go forward based

Although Bates's first four causes of action also expressly rely on the administrative
proceeding, he has conceded that those claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
(Appellant's Br. at 13.)

17

solely on certain alleged non-petitioning activities. As recognized by Westlands Water
District Distribution District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 276 F. Supp. 2d
1046 (E.D. Ca. 2003), "Noerr immunity bars any claim, federal or state, common law or
statutory, that has as its gravamen constitutionally-protected petitioning activity." Id. at
1053 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, Bates cannot sever or parse out that
conduct from the remaining allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, and this
Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of Bates's Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Ninth Causes of Action pursuant to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.
2.

The petition was directed towards the government.

Bates relies upon Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492
(1988), to support his contention that the UDRE was not really functioning as a
governmental entity for purposes of Noerr-Pennington/the First Amendment but, rather, a
"captive" agency of the UAR. In Allied Tube, the National Fire Protection Association, a
"private, voluntary organization with more than 31,500 individual and group members,"
published product standards and codes, including the National Electrical Code. Id. at
495. Although that code was routinely adopted "into law with little or no change" by a
number of state and local governments, id., the Court refused to hold that the NFPA
should be treated as a "quasi-legislative body," declaring:
The dividing line between restraints resulting from governmental action
and those resulting from private action may not always be obvious. But
where, as here, the restraint is imposed by persons unaccountable to the
public and without official authority, many of whom have personal
financial interests in restraining competition, we have no difficulty
concluding that the restraint has resulted from private action.
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Id. at 501-02. Bates argues that Allied Tube should be applied because the Utah Real
Estate Commission, the UDRE's governing body, consisted of members that were his
competitors. Bates fails to challenge the district court's findings that the UDRE "is a
governmental entity that regulates and licenses all real estate professionals in the State of
Utah," that it "had the power and the ability to discipline Bates and to revoke his license,"
and that it "had the power to grant the relief allegedly sought by Defendants." (R. 1544
(Mem. Dec. at 21).)5
Unlike the wholly private trade association in Allied Tube, the UDRE is a state
agency created by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-201. Pursuant to Section 61-2201, the UDRE is responsible for "the administration and enforcement" of the Real Estate
Licensing and Practices Act and Chapter 2 of Title 61 of the Utah Code. See id. The
UDRE is also responsible for investigating and enforcing adherence to the laws and rules
applicable to real estate agents, and for evaluating and investigating complaints made
against licensed individuals. Thus, unlike in Allied Tube, the UDRE has "official
authority . . . conferred on it by [the] government."

Consequently, the defendants'

alleged petitions to the UDRE unquestionably fall within the definition of political
activity for purposes of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.
Bates argues that the Utah Real Estate Commission should not be considered an
administrative agency because its members were allegedly members of the UAR.6
However, as the district court concluded, "[t]hat members of the Utah Real Estate
The court was authorized to take judicial notice of such findings. See Utah R. Evid. 201.
These allegations do not appear in the Second Amended Complaint.
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Commission are also members of UAR does not change the governmental nature of the
UDRE administrative proceedings any more than a judge's membership in a state bar
changes the governmental character of legal proceedings." (R. 1544 (Mem. Dec. at 21).)
To the extent Bates is arguing that members of the UDRE were conspiring with
the defendants, the United States Supreme Court has expressly refused to adopt a
conspiracy exception to Noerr--Pennington, even when it is alleged that "governmental
officials conspire with a private party to employ government action as a means of stifling
competition."7

City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 374, 382

(1991). "For purposes of Noerr-Pennington, there is no distinction between petitioning
governmental officials and conspiring with them." GF Gaming Corp. v. City of Black
Hawk, 405 F.3d 876, 883-84 (10th Cir, 2005). Since Bates was never denied access to
the tribunals of the UDRE, his claims of conspiracy and/or bias are insufficient to
overcome the immunity afforded under Noerr-Pennington.
D.

The district court correctly concluded that the sham exception to
Noerr-Pennington immunity was inapplicable.

There is a limited exception to Noerr-Pennington/First Amendment immunity
known as the "sham" exception. To come within it, a party must show that (a) the
underlying petition was "objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant
could realistically expect success" on the merits, Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc.
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993); and (b) that the underlying
7

Bates also argues that the members of the UDRE acted outside the scope of their authority by
conducting their investigation when they had no subject matter jurisdiction. But the UDRE did
not act outside the scope of its authority in investigating complaints that Bates violated several
provisions of Utah Code § 61-2-11 (2008).
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petition was brought with the subjective intent to harm the plaintiff rather than to procure
the relief sought in the petition. See id, at 61; Anderson, 2005 UT 36,fflf27-28 (holding
that a sham petition is one "designed solely to harass" and not "genuinely designed to
achieve the[] desired outcome" of the petition).
If the Court concludes that a petition is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable
outcome, it is immunized under Noerr-Pennington, and a "claim premised on the sham
exception must fail" regardless of the petitioner's intent in bringing the petition. Prof I
Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60.

"Only if challenged litigation is objectively

meritless may a court examine the litigant's subjective motivation." Ids The sham
exception is inapplicable here because the UDRE complaint was not objectively meritless
and the underlying petition was brought with the intent to procure the relief sought.
1.

The UDRE complaint was not objectively meritless.

Under the objective prong of the sham exception, the Court must analyze whether
the underlying petition constituted the pursuit of baseless claims that no reasonable
litigant could have realistically expected to secure favorable relief. Prof I Real Estate
Investors, 508 U.S. at 62. This is essentially a probable cause inquiry. "The existence of
'"[T]he right of the people to inform their representative in government of their desires with
respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon their
intent in doing so."' Prof I Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 58 (quoting Noerr). If a party has
the right to bring an objectively legitimate petition, they may do so regardless of motive.
Consequently, "a successful 'effort to influence governmental action ... certainly cannot be
characterized as a sham.'" Id. (quoted reference omitted). "[W]e have repeatedly reaffirmed
that evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose alone cannot transform otherwise legitimate
activity into a sham." Id. at 59. "[T]he legality of objectively reasonable petitioning 'directed
toward obtaining governmental action' is 'not at all affected by any ... purpose [the actor] may
have had.'" Id. (quoted reference omitted). A court can determine that a governmental petition
was objectively reasonable "as a matter of law." Id. at 63.
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probable cause to institute legal proceedings precludes a finding that [a] ... defendant has
engaged in sham litigation." Id. "Probable cause to institute civil proceedings requires
no more than a 'reasonable] belie[f] that there is a chance that [a] claim may be held
valid upon adjudication.'" Id. at 62-63 (quoting Hubbard v. Beatty & Hyde, Inc., 178
N.E.2d 485, 488 (Mass. 1961) (alterations in original)). "Where, as here, there is no
dispute over the predicate facts of the underlying legal proceeding, a court may decide
probable cause as a matter of law." Id. at 63.
Disregarding his prior claim that the defendants petitioned the UDRE for the sole
purpose of obtaining the revocation of his license, Bates now argues that the
Administrative Law Judge's decision that the UDRE lacked subject matter jurisdiction is
dispositive as to the issue of whether the defendants' petitioning activities were a sham.
A failure to achieve the desired governmental outcome, however, cannot single-handedly
transform the activity into a sham. Prof I Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60 n.5
("[W]hen the antitrust defendant has lost the underlying litigation [or action], a court
must resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding
that an ultimately unsuccessful action must have been unreasonable or without
foundation.

The court must remember that even when the law or the facts appear

questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground
for bringing suit." (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also Havoco of
America, Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 1983) ("That they were
unsuccessful does not automatically transform their attempt into a sham.").
Although it was ultimately found that the UDRE lacked subject matter jurisdiction
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to investigate the conduct of Bates, such a ruling does not mean the defendants' alleged
petitioning activities were a sham. As noted by the district court, the ALJ's application
of R162-7-1 is questionable given that the UDRE petition "did not constitute a complaint
'between licensees regarding claims to commissions'" when the "only licensee that was a
party to the complaint was Bates." (R.1168 (Opinion at 24).) Additionally, the UDRE
proceeding "was strictly a licensing proceeding" and did not contain a claim for
"monetary relief ... sought by another licensee." (R. 1168 (Opinion at 24).) Since an
agency's interpretation of its own rules will be upheld absent a "determination [that it]
exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality," McBride v. Motor Vehicle Div.,
1999 UT 9, f 12, 977 P.2d 467, this Court should conclude that the UDRE had
jurisdiction to investigate allegations that Bates's conduct in failing to pay commissions
due and owing to his real estate agents constituted a violation of Section 61-2-1.9
Bates's has admitted non-payment of commissions, which gave the defendants
probable cause to initiate a complaint. As such, Bates cannot demonstrate that the
defendants' petitions to the UDRE were "objectively baseless" under the test from Prof I
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993).
2.

The underlying petition was brought with the intent to procure
the relief sought in the petition.

Even if Bates was able to demonstrate that the administrative proceedings were
objectively baseless, he would still be unable to establish the second prong of the sham
test. Bates cannot show the administrative proceedings were brought with the subjective
Bates concedes in his Second Amended Complaint that "AllPro was unable to pay due
commissions." (R. 327 (If 331).)
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intent to harm him rather than to procure the relief sought.
The Second Amended Complaint alleged that the defendants' petitions to the
UDRE were for the purpose of obtaining the revocation of Bates's license. (See R. 325
(Sec. Am. Compl. ^| 322 ("Defendants tried to have the Plaintiffs broker's license
removed,

improperly

and

under

improper

pretense

using

said

administrative

proceeding."). Since such an allegation establishes that Defendants' alleged conduct was
"genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action," the sham exception does
not apply. Anderson, 2005 UT 36, ^| 27.
Even if the defendants were found to have used "improper means" to achieve the
revocation of Bates's license, such a finding would "not be sufficient to except [them]
from the immunity provided under Noerr-Pennington in light of their uncontested intent
to achieve a favorable governmental result." Anderson, 2005 UT 36, ^| 28.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING MAY ALSO BE AFFIRMED ON
ALTERNATE GROUNDS.
Since Bates failed to adequately plead his Second Amended Complaint to properly

distinguish among the numerous defendants, this Court may also affirm the district
court's ruling on alternate grounds. First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT
56, f 11, 52 P.3d 1137. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to set forth "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The purpose is to
"give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim."
Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, 475 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 1970); see also Coroles v.
Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, U 23, 79 P.3d 974.
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The sufficiency of a complaint "must be determined by the facts pleaded rather
than the conclusions stated." Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,
2001 UT 25, 1f 26, 21 P.3d 198. Utah's appellate courts "have stressed, and continue to
hold, that mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of
relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude" dismissal. Id. % 36.
The Second Amended Complaint asserts nine separate causes of action against 13
named defendants and 60 "Doe" defendants. The claims asserted include four theories of
defamation, a claim for civil conspiracy, two varieties of tortious interference with
economic relations, and a statutory claim for unfair business practices. The Second
Amended Complaint contains a total of 403 separate allegations, spanning 69 pages. For
the most part, it takes a shotgun approach to liability, failing to differentiate the conduct
of the various defendants, and tying the liability of all of them to the specific actions of
some defendants under broad strokes of agency.
"Given the complaint's use of either the collective term 'Defendants' or a list of
the defendants named individually but with no distinction as to what acts are attributable
to whom, it is impossible for any of these individuals to ascertain what particular . . . acts
they are alleged to have committed." Robbins v. Okla. ex rel Dep't of Human Servs., 519
F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Cline v. Brown, 2008 UT App 319, 2008 Utah
App. LEXIS 312, at *2-*3. This is particularly true of Ostermiller and NWAR, who are
mentioned only cryptically and sporadically throughout the Second Amended Complaint
and are most often grouped together with the other "Defendants."
Through an examination of the Second Amended Complaint, one might be able to
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deduce that Ostermiller met with some of the defendants in November 2008 to discuss
how to administratively revoke Bates's real estate license. (See, e.g., R. 286, 307 (Sec.
Am. Compl.ffl[90, 223.)) But Bates does not allege what was said by Ostermiller during
that alleged meeting, what Ostermiller's or NWAR's role in the conspiracy was, nor does
Bates allege any facts to establish that they took any action to participate in the alleged
conspiracies that followed. In an attempt to tie the conduct of all of the defendants to the
specific actions of some, Bates relies on bald, conclusory assertions that "each Defendant
was acting as the agent of the other, and each was acting in the course and scope of its
agency with its principal," (id. at R. 296; ^j 168).
Such phantom allegations of agency, untethered to concrete actions, are
insufficient to state a claim against Ostermilier or NWAR. The bald assertions of agency
that so predominate the Second Amended Complaint do not relieve Bates's of his
obligation to plead "relevant surrounding facts." There are simply no facts alleged in the
Second Amended Complaint that demonstrate agency. As such, this Court should affirm
the district court's dismissal of Bates's claims against the defendants.
IV.

BATES FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR WHICH RELIEF MAY BE
GRANTED IN REGARD TO THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER
THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT.
The conduct alleged by Bates is not governed by nor actionable under Utah's

Unfair Practices Act. Bates's Fifth Cause of Action (R. 305) seeks to recover treble
damages and injunctive relief recover under Utah's Unfair Practices act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 13-5-1 to -18. The conduct declared unlawful under Unfair Practices Act is contained
in Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-3. The type of action contemplated by the Unfair Practices
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Act is an action "by a third party who seeks to enjoin further price discriminations or to
recover damages." Burt v. Woolsulate, Inc., 106 Utah 156, 162-163 (Utah 1944).
Bates makes no allegations of price discrimination under the Unfair Practices Act.
R. 305-14. Rather than do so, Bates alleges he "was discriminated against in the
enforcement of [] policy against him." R. 306. He also alleges "an intricate conspiracy to
destroy [his] career." Id. The Second Amended Complaint strains to rely on the general
policy provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-17, but this section has been rejected as a
ground for a cause of action. Since Bates failed to allege any unlawful conduct in
violation of section 13-5-3 of the Unfair Practices Act, his fifth cause of action must fail.
Bates's reliance on the general policy statement of the Unfair Practices Act is
fatally flawed. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-14. Although Bates cites to Utah Code Ann. §
13-5-17 as the provision violated by Defendants/Appellees, that section is merely a
general statement of legislative intent: "the purpose of this act is to safeguard the public
against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage
competition, by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest
competition is destroyed or prevented."
By combining the two sections, Bates attempts to establish that he has a right of
action because Utah Code Ann. §13-5-14 provides a right of action for violations of the
Act, and because certain defendants allegedly violated Utah Code Ann. §13-5-17.
Utah courts have clarified that a cause of action exists only for violations
expressly prohibited by the act, and that the Act's general purpose provisions (Utah Code
Ann. § 13-5-17) do not extend liability. Although the Act provides for an award of treble
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damages, only those acts expressly defined as "a violation of this act" or as "unlawful"
qualify. Neither the Actfs general purpose nor the "liberal construction" of its terms can
extend civil liability or the Act's criminal sanctions beyond the "unfair and discriminatory
practices" expressly "prohibited" by the Act itself. MacArthur v. San Juan County, 416
F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1181 (D. Utah 2005). "Where, as here, the plaintiffs fail to plead or
otherwise identify acts by one or more defendants that violate the Utah Unfair Practices
Act's specific provisions, neither the conclusory allegation of a violation nor the
generalized assertion of interference with freedom of contract can sustain their treble
damages claims under that Act." Id.
The Unfair Practices Act applies only to anticompetitive price discrimination, and
that section 13-5-17's general policy statement does not create other causes of action. In
Garrad v. Gateway Financial Services, Inc., 2009 UT 22, 207 P.3d 1227, a plaintiff
purchased a bedroom set under six-month financing agreement, and then failed to make
monthly payments. The matter was tried before a jury, and Gateway Financial moved for
directed verdict on the basis that the plaintiff had not proven a violation of the Unfair
Practices Act. On appeal, Garrad sought to extend the reach of the Act beyond
anticompetitive price discrimination by application.
The court declined to expand the scope of the Unfair Practices Act, and held
"there is no indication that the Utah Legislature intended the Act to reach any practices
beyond anticompetitive behavior." Garrady 2009 UT 22, \ 9, 207 P.3d at 1230. The
plaintiff, referred to Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-17 as proof that the Act should be expanded
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beyond anticompetitive behavior. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the argument
because "the legislature intended the Act to apply only to anticompetitive behavior." Id.
The "anticompetitive behavior" is discriminatory pricing. See Utah Code Ann.
§13-5-3 (making price discrimination unlawful). "The Utah Unfair Practice Act makes
unlawful '[ujnfair methods of competition in commerce or trade.' The Act prohibits anticompetitive discriminatory pricing and advertising goods the retailer is not prepared to
supply Garrad, 2009 UT 22, f 9, 207 P.3d at 1229. The court left no doubt that causes of
action under the Unfair Practices Act must allege statutory violations. "The Utah Act is
unambiguous in its focus on competition and monopolistic behavior; therefore, we do not
look to outside sources to define the practices the Utah Act would deem unfair or
deceptive. Id.^l.

Since Bates has failed to plead any unlawful discrimination in

violation of specific provisions of the Act, his fifth cause of action must fail.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Ostermiller, Hoover and NWAR request that this Court
dismiss all of Bates's claims.
Dated this 19th day of July, 2012.
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